We examine a natural experiment and a field experiment that provided direct information on school test scores to lower-income families in a public school choice plan. Receiving information significantly increases the fraction of parents choosing higher-performing schools. Parents with high-scoring alternatives nearby were more likely to choose non-guaranteed schools with higher test scores. Using random variation from each experiment, we find that attending a higher-scoring school increases student test scores. The results imply that school choice will most effectively increase academic achievement for disadvantaged students when parents have easy access to test score information and good options to choose from.
I. Introduction
Several urban public school districts are currently experimenting with public school choice plans, and the federal No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of 2001 includes a choice provision allowing students in failing schools to choose to attend non-failing schools outside of their neighborhood. The goal of these choice plans is to increase academic outcomes for disadvantaged students by allowing them to attend higher-performing schools and by creating pressure on failing schools to improve through the threat of losing students, implicitly assuming that parents select schools for academics when offered the opportunity to do so. However, recent work on parental choice has found that low-income families place much less weight on academics when choosing schools, decreasing the immediate academic gains for those exercising choice (Hastings, Kane, and Staiger 2007) , as well as the pressure for low-performing schools to improve academic achievement (Hastings, Kane, and Staiger 2006) . 1 It may be the case that, all else equal, low-income families place lower weights on school test scores because they rationally expect lower returns to education for their children. Alternatively, these families may place a high value on academic outcomes but find it more costly to act on those preferences, leading to lower expressed preferences for academic achievement. Several recent papers have explored how salience and cognitive costs affect consumer decisions in a wide-range of markets, including retail purchases, Medicare plans, credit cards, and retirement investments (Chetty, Looney, and Kroft [2007] , Kling et al. [2008] , Ausubel [1991] , Hastings and Tejeda-Ashton [2008] , respectively). If lower-income families face higher costs of gathering and interpreting statistics on academic achievement, they may 1 In addition to these papers, Schneider and Buckley (2002) monitored the search behavior of parents on an Internet web site for public schools in Washington, DC, and show that academics are more important search criteria for college-educated parents. Fossey (1994) and Armor and Peiser (1998) studied the characteristics of school districts' gaining and losing students in a Massachusetts interdistrict choice program and find that non-minority students and students with high-test scores were more likely to change districts. On the other hand, Jacob and Lefgren (2007) examined parental choices of individual teachers within schools and find that higher-poverty and minority parents are less likely to actively select a teacher, but conditional on choosing a teacher, parents in higher-poverty and minority schools place more emphasis on measures of teachers' ability to raise achievement, rather than student satisfaction.
choose schools based on easier-to-determine characteristics such as proximity, instead of school test scores.
If this is the case, policy interventions that reduce the cost of acquiring and analyzing comparative information on school academic achievement may result in more parents choosing higher-performing schools within a public school choice plan.
2 This paper uses a natural experiment and a field experiment in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Public School District (CMS) to examine the degree to which transparent and easily accessible information on school-level academic performance impacts the schools that parents choose for their children, the importance they place on academic achievement when choosing schools, and the impact that attending higher-performing schools has on subsequent student outcomes.
Each spring since 2002 parents in CMS could submit their top three school choices for their children for the next school year. To find information on schools, they could reference a 100-plus-page school choice guide with self-descriptions of the positive aspects of each school. However, to access objective statistics on student achievement, parents would have to search the CMS website and make a comparison school by school. In the summer of 2004, after the annual school choice process had been completed, CMS re-sent choice forms along with a three-page spreadsheet printout of test scores at every school in the district (sorted alphabetically by name) to each family with a child enrolled at an NCLB-sanctioned school to comply with NCLB regulation. 3 We use this implementation of NCLB as a natural experiment, comparing the choices parents made in the spring with no direct test score information to the choices they made in the summer with the NCLB-mandated information, to estimate the impact of information on parents' school choices.
2 Making information more salient can be represented as lowering decision-making costs in the terminology of Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2007) . 3 This was the first year that any school could be categorized as "Title I Improving" under NCLB in CMS. Each state completed a Consolidated State Application Accountability Workbook for NCLB, and states may have varied in the specifics of how they would implement the broad goals of the regulation. In Section III we will outline how Title I status and AYP are determined in the state of North Carolina and in CMS.
We then analyze data from a field experiment we conducted during the 2006-2007 school choice process.
Working with CMS, we provided information sheets with the school choice forms to parents with children in randomly selected schools serving primarily low-to middle-income neighborhoods. 4 The sheets provided either clear statistics on academic achievement for each school in the child's choice set or information on academic achievement coupled with estimated odds of admission. The information presented was simpler than the NCLB-mandated information in that it appeared in a one-page format, was sorted by the academic ranking of schools (instead of alphabetically), and contained only information on the schools relevant for the child's choice (e.g., only elementary schools for elementary school children).
The simplified information was given to students at unsanctioned schools, where the control group received no direct information on test score performance, as well as at NCLB-sanctioned schools where the control group received the NCLB-mandated three-page spreadsheet. This allows us to estimate the impact that the simpler one-page format had over no direct information, as well as the added impact it had over the NCLB-mandated information.
In both of these experimental settings, we find that providing parents with direct information on school test scores resulted in significantly more parents choosing higher scoring schools for their children. Both the three-page NCLB-mandated information and our one-page information format increased the proportion of parents choosing non-guaranteed schools by 5 to 7 percentage points and increased the average test score of schools chosen by 0.05 to 0.10 student-level standard deviations, relative to the control group that received no direct information on test scores. We do not find evidence that our simpler one-page format had substantial added impact over the NCLB format, suggesting that gains from simplified information flatten out eventually.
The overall impact of receiving information on the test score of the school chosen represents the average impact of receiving information across parents who still chose their guaranteed school (zero impact) and 4 We will discuss restrictions placed on the field experiment by CMS in Section IV.
parents who selected schools with significantly higher test scores. For example, the 16% of parents who responded to NCLB-mandated information in 2004 by choosing an alternative school chose schools with 0.5 student-level standard deviations higher test scores than the schools they had chosen in the spring. In both settings, we find that a key predictor of both responding to information by choosing an alternative school and the test score of the school chosen is proximity to high-scoring school alternatives. This is consistent with a model where parents choose schools to maximize utility, which is increasing in expected academic achievement but decreasing in time and travel costs, and implies that, even with transparent information, school choice can only be as effective as the options offered to parents.
Next, we examine if an increase in the test scores of the schools parents chose led to improvements in their children's own academic performance. We use instrumental variables approaches, exploiting random variation generated in the test score of the school attended to estimate the impact of attending a higher-scoring school on student academic outcomes. In the 2004 NCLB natural experiment, summer lottery admissions to schools chosen in response to NCLB-mandated notification provide exogenous variation in the score of the school attended. In the 2006-2007 field experiment, we instrument for the score of the school attended with the receipt of information and its interactions with baseline characteristics that lower the expected cost of choosing a higher-scoring school. 5 In both experiments, we find large but marginally significant impacts of the test score of the school attended on own test scores.
The point estimates imply gains in own test scores of 0.37 -0.41 student-level standard deviations from attending a school with a one standard deviation higher average test score. We compare our findings to those from prior studies that have examined the impact on own achievement of attending a school with higher average test scores in the context of choice without simplified information (Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt 2006; Cullen and Jacob 2007; Hastings, Kane, and Staiger 2007) and in the context of student assignment without choice (Hoxby and Weingarth-Salyer 2005; Hastings and Weinstein 2008) .
II. Background Description of the CMS School Choice Plan
Before the introduction of a school choice plan in the fall of 2002, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Public School District (CMS) operated under a racial desegregation order for three decades. For the [2002] [2003] school year, CMS moved to a district-wide school choice plan in response to a court order to cease busing for racial integration. In the spring of 2002, parents were asked to submit their top three choices of school programs for each child. Each student was assigned a "home school" in her neighborhood. This school was typically one of the closest schools to her, and she was guaranteed admission to this school.
Admission to non-guaranteed schools was granted based on a lottery. In the initial implementation of the school choice program, CMS underwent a large redistricting of home school assignments; approximately 50% of parcels lost property rights to the school they had rights to under busing.
In the first year of choice, the district required every parent to submit a choice form, and it achieved a 95% compliance rate. In each year after the initial choice year, only parents of students in rising grades (K, 6 th , 9 th ), new students to the district, students affected by the opening of new schools, and parents who wished to change their children's school were required to submit choice forms. Each year a significant fraction of schools in the district is oversubscribed. 6 The lottery process for assigning students to oversubscribed schools has continued since the introduction of school choice in 2002. Under the lottery system, students are first assigned to priority groups by school and grade. The priority groups have varied from year to year but generally have given priority to higher-poverty and lower-performing students who choose lower-poverty and higher-performing schools. 7 Within each priority group, admission is determined by randomly assigned lottery number alone.
In order for parents to determine which schools to choose, CMS provided several resources. First, each year CMS produced a school choice guide that was approximately 100 pages long. It contained detailed instructions on how to complete the school choice form and how to submit it, along with a brief description of the lottery process. 8 The bulk of the choice book was devoted to written descriptions of each school and program, from pre-school through high school. There are approximately 120 elementary, 40 middle, and 30 high school choice options in the district. The descriptions were written by the schools, describing the positive features each school offered to students. Objective measures of school characteristics, such as average test score performance, suspension rates, or racial compositions, were not included.
In addition, CMS provided a Family Application Center that parents could phone or visit to ask questions about the school choice process. The staff members at the Family Application Center emphasized the positive aspects of each school during their discussions with parents. In particular, staff members were supposed to respond to questions like "Which school is the best school?" by advising parents to discuss
with their children what their needs were and then to visit the different school options to determine which school was the best for their children, since what a "good" school is depends on each individual child. 9 It is important to note that this advice may be correct, as the relationship between school average test scores and student achievement has not been strongly established. However, it suggests to parents that identifying a "good" school takes a substantial and potentially daunting investment of time and effort. 7 The priority group definitions were initially based on free-and reduced-lunch status and the concentration of free-and reducedlunch recipients at a school. Since the use of lunch recipient status has recently received negative attention, CMS moved to use test score performance as a priority instead. Students performing below average on end of year exams are given priority for admission to schools performing at or above the district average on standardized exams. 8 Parents were not told how the lottery was run (e.g., first-choice maximizer) or how the "priority boosts" were implemented. 14 This information is only provided to parents of students slated to attend a NCLB school in the subsequent school year. It is also important to note that the notification that the school had been designated a "Title I Choice School" was itself a three-page written document. It minimized the extent to which AYP had implications for a school's quality, listed the positive features of the NCLB school, and encouraged parents to work with the school to continue its improvement. Thus it is not clear that a parent would conclude from this letter that their school was "bad" or "failing." Although the term "failing school" is used in the NCLB literature, it is never used in CMS. Instead schools are labeled as "Title I Choice Schools" under NCLB because they did not meet AYP. Hence, this letter did not use terminology or convey the idea of "failing" in the way that alternative programs such as the Florida A+ program might (Figlio and Rouse 2006 Given the number of responders alone, it appears that NCLB notification had a significant impact on parental choice. Table IV examines which types of parents were more likely to respond to NCLB-mandated information by choosing an alternative school, and of those parents, which ones were more likely to choose higherscoring schools. Suppose that, once a parent is fully informed about the academic performance at each choice option, they select a school to maximize utility which is increasing in expected academic achievement but decreasing in commuting costs to schools. Simplified information on test scores may lower information costs, increasing the implicit weight parents place on academics when choosing a school. However, parents may still face trade-offs from time and transportation costs that censor the impact of information on observed choice behavior. We might expect to see the largest impact of information on parental choice where these other costs of choosing a school are lowest, for example, where there are proximate high-scoring school alternatives. 
where y i is an indicator for whether the parent chose an alternative to their NCLB school (columns (1) and (2)) or the average test score at the first-choice school conditional on having chosen an alternative school in July (columns (3) and (4)), X i is a vector of student characteristics, R i are NCLB school and program fixed effects, and i ε is a random error term that allows for clustering at the NCLB school-program and grade level. Columns (1) and (3) present results for the entire sample, while columns (2) and (4) The results imply that proximity to high-scoring schools with one student-level standard deviation higher test scores increases the probability of responding to information by choosing an alternative school by 9.1 -11.0 percentage points (columns (1) and (2)). Columns (3) and (4) show that, conditional on choosing an alternative school, parents with higher-scoring schools within five miles choose significantly higherscoring alternatives (0.186 -0.233 student-level standard deviation increase). Although the average score of and distance to schools within five miles are relatively ad hoc measures of choice set characteristics, they do have the impact on choice behavior we would expect to see if parental choice response to simplified information were constrained by factors that affect the cost of choosing high-performing schools.
In addition to choice set characteristics, demographic characteristics are also significant determinants of the response to information. Both parents with a single child in CMS and parents of rising-grade children were more likely to choose out in July; however, conditional on choosing out, they did not choose significantly higher-scoring schools.
16 This is consistent with the hypothesis that these characteristics may lower the costs of choosing an alternative school, but they may not be associated with a higher implicit value for academic achievement. African American parents were more likely to choose out in July; 16 We define a student as a single child if there are no other children registered in CMS with the same last name and street address. While this may not capture all siblings, it at least captures those for whom schooling decisions are made from the same residential address and within the same family unit. It is also the definition used by CMS when defining sibling status. Rising grade students are those who going into Kindergarten, 6 th , or 9 th grade and will therefore be changing school locations for the next school year as they transition to the next education level.
however, conditional on choosing out, both African Americans and parents of free-and-reduced lunch recipients selected significantly lower performing schools.
17 Interestingly, both high-scoring students and those with past suspensions were more likely to choose out in July. While high-and low-performing students sought to attend alternative schools, conditional on choosing out, test scores and suspension rates had no significant effect on the test score of the school chosen. Unexcused absences, on the other hand, decrease significantly the probability of choosing out, as well as the test score of the school chosen, although the magnitudes of the coefficients are small. As we might expect, the regression results in columns (1) and (3) also show that parents who chose out in the spring were also significantly more likely to choose out in July and, conditional on choosing out, selected higher-scoring schools.
Overall, the NCLB-mandated information facilitated the choice of a higher-performing alternative school for a significant fraction of parents. Importantly, we find that proximity to high-performing schools is a key factor in determining the probability of responding to information by choosing an alternative, higherscoring school. Because NCLB-mandated information was given only to parents of children at Title I Choice Schools, direct information on test scores may not have the same impact in the broader population of low-to middle-income families. In addition, information that the school did not make AYP and had been designated a Title I Choice School may have an additional impact on parent's choices over information on school test scores alone. 18 Hence we conducted a field experiment in CMS during the 2006-2007 school choice process to examine if the impacts on parental choice hold more broadly in the population of families at non-NCLB schools.
IV. A Field Experiment in the 2006-2007 School Choice Plan
Working with CMS, we designed simplified information sheets to attach to parents' school choice forms for the 2006-2007 school choice round to test if simplified information has a similar effect on parental choice outside of the NCLB sub-population and also if moving to a simpler one-page format has an added impact over the three-page NCLB-mandated test score information. The field experiment was limited by the district in several important ways. First, students attending the same school and living in the same choice zone had to receive the same type of information. Hence, information was randomized at the school and choice-zone level (school-zone). 19 Second, the set of schools was restricted to NCLB schools and non-NCLB schools serving low-to middle-income neighborhoods, and we were asked to limit the number of forms provided to non-NCLB students to a few thousand. As in prior years, choice forms were provided to all students slated to attend NCLB schools (to comply with the choice requirements of the law), to rising grade students (going into Kindergarten, 6 th , or 9 th grade in the next school year), and to students whose home-school assignments for the 2006-2007 school year were affected by the opening of new schools. Our simplified information sheet was attached to this choice form, so grade restrictions held as well.
In addition, we were restricted to providing information on test scores and odds of admission. After the first year of school choice, a significant number of schools in the district were over-subscribed, admitting few, if any, students each year. Despite this fact, demand for these schools did not decline. 20 We combined odds of admission with test scores to examine how, if at all, parents would react to clear information on admit chance. We randomly selected school-zones to receive either Score forms (test score information only) or Odds forms (test scores coupled with odds of admission) subject to the constraints listed above. The randomization was done separately for each of the segments of schools: pre-K (rising kindergarten), 5 th graders (rising 6 th ), 8 th graders (rising 9 th ), and NCLB students. There were 6,328 non-NCLB students in 46 school-zones (39 schools) who were part of the field experiment, and 10,134 NCLB students in 31 school-zones (19 schools).
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The simplified information forms were specialized for each child. They contained a list of schools in the student's choice set, which depended on the student's choice zone and her home school assignment for . 22 The scores were calculated from the prior year's average performance of students in that school and program on standardized tests and then re-scaled to correspond to a percentage score that looks like a grade. 23 The odds of admission were calculated based on the prior year's admission rates. The information sheets incorporated the CMS logo and its graphic themes and were designed to look as if they were made by and came from the school district. 22 Two types of each form were given: one with only numeric information on test scores and one with a graphical apple rating that represented the numeric scores in addition to the numbers themselves. The graphical addition was randomized within school and homeroom, since it technically added no new information. We did not find that further simplification affected choices, so we pool the choice forms with and without graphics for this analysis. 23 The schools in each information table were sorted by test score. The guaranteed school option for each child was presented separately in its own line below the test score table. This was done to facilitate personalizing the information sheets for each child and to match the way the choices were listed on the actual choice form. Typically, the guaranteed choice was open to lottery choices, so it would be listed in test-score-order within the table as well. However, in some instances where the guaranteed choice was not open for students to choose in, it only appeared as a separate line below the choice table. This was the case, for example, in Figure III but not in Figure II. design. The staff at the Family Application Center reported seeing parents with their simplified information sheets in hand, with notes written on the forms as they made their decisions.
Tables V and VI examine the effect that simplified information had on aggregate choice behavior. The outcome measures of interest are aggregated or averaged at the school-zone level, that is, the level at which the treatment was assigned. Table V shows that average baseline characteristics are balanced across treatment and control groups. The first three columns give the means of the dependent variables (baseline characteristics) for the treatment and control groups. The last two columns give the coefficient from a regression of each dependent variable on whether the school-zone received Score or Odds forms, controlling for randomization-block fixed effects:
where T S 1 and T S 2 are indicators for whether students in school-zone S received the Score form or the Odds form, respectively, and R S are randomization-block fixed effects. All of the coefficients are insignificant, implying that baseline characteristics are balanced across treatment and control groups.
Table VI presents regression results from specification (2), where the dependent variables are the fraction of parents listing a non-guaranteed school as their first choice and the average difference between the test score of the first-choice school and the test score at the guaranteed school (test score gain). Panel 1 presents results pooled across non-NCLB and NCLB school-zones. Panels 2 and 3 present results separately for non-NCLB and NCLB school-zones, respectively, since the information available to the control groups differs across those two samples. Within each panel, the first two rows report the treatment effect of receiving a Score form or an Odds form, while the third row presents the pooled treatment effect of receiving either type of form. Columns (1) and (2) provide ordinary least squares estimates, while 24 Because the randomization was done separately within the different grade levels for non-NCLB schools and zones, and since class sizes vary across these zones, we control for randomization-block fixed effects (Rouse 1998). columns (3) and (4) provide weighted least squares estimates, where each school-zone observation is weighted by the number of students in that school-zone.
The first panel of estimates shows no significant overall impact of transparent information on parental choice behavior pooled across the non-NCLB and NCLB observations. However, the second panel shows that among the non-NCLB school-zones, where the control group received no direct information on test scores, information had a significant impact on choices. Receiving information on test scores increased the fraction of parents who chose a non-guaranteed school by about 7 percentage points, off of a base of 31%. This implies that simplified information on test scores increased demand for non-guaranteed schools by an economically significant 23%. Receiving information on odds of admission and test scores did not have a significant impact on the fraction of parents choosing non-guaranteed schools, although the point estimates are similar in magnitude to the point estimates on Score form. 25 Both forms have similar effects on the average difference between the test score of the first-choice school and the test score at the guaranteed school; Score forms and Odds forms caused an increase of about 0.10 student-level standard deviations (a 70% increase relative to the mean of 0.14). If we pool the receipt of a Scores or an Odds form into one indicator for received information, the overall impact on parental choice is similar and slightly more significant. Hence, in the non-NCLB group, parents respond to information by choosing alternative schools with significantly higher test scores.
These results are similar in magnitude to the results in Table II This suggests that our information may have no additional effect over the NCLB-mandated information.
Indeed, the third panel of results in Table VI presents estimates of the effects on aggregate choice behavior in the NCLB sample of school-zones. Here the control group received the three-page NCLB- 25 Hastings, Van Weelden, and Weinstein (2007) find that simplified information on test scores also affected the average number of choices that parents listed. School-zones receiving Score forms had a significant 24% increase in the average number of choices listed, relative to the control group. However, school-zones receiving Odds forms had no significant average increase in the number of choices listed relative to the control group. This implies that knowing the odds of admission along with the test score of each choice decreased the number of choices listed relative to receiving information on test scores alone. mandated information; insignificant results imply that our simplified information had no effect above and beyond the NCLB-mandated information. This suggests that the impact of providing easy-to-access and transparent information flattens out eventually, and most of the effect on choices may come from providing clear statistics at the time of choice, rather than the exact format those statistics appear in.
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As in the 2004 NCLB natural experiment, we can use student-level data to examine which families were more likely to respond to our information sheets by choosing substantially better schools. Table VII presents results for the non-NCLB sample from regressions of the form:
where X i is a vector of student characteristics such as race and lunch recipient status, as well as characteristics of the student's choice set that might affect her choices, such as the average test score at local schools and the average distance to local schools. The R i are randomization-block fixed effects. We combine the forms into one treatment for "received information", T i , which is an indicator for whether the child received a Score form or an Odds form, and Z i T i is a vector of interactions between baseline characteristics and the treatment indicator. Standard errors are clustered at the school-zone and grade level.
Column (1) shows the interaction effects of receiving information on the gain in the score of the firstchoice school relative to the guaranteed school, and column (2) shows the same regression restricted to the sample of students that chose a non-guaranteed school. Both columns show that the average impact of receiving information on the score of the school chosen is significantly increasing in the average test score of schools within five miles, implying that simplified information will have the largest impact on observed choices where the cost of choosing higher-scoring schools is lowest. These results are similar to the results found using the 2004 NCLB natural experiment and emphasize that, while simplified 26 Alternatively, it may be the case that this group of parents is relatively inert. Parents who would have responded to NCLB information and notification may have already responded by choosing out in prior years. Hence the remaining students have parents who are not responsive to information on academic outcomes. information may have a large impact on the implicit weight parents place on academics, this impact will only be expressed through changes in observable choice behavior for families whose costs of choosing good schools, once they can identify them, are relatively low.
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Among the interactions with demographics, we again find that parents of children with no other identifiable siblings in CMS were more likely to respond to information by changing their choice behavior. This may be because these families face fewer transportation constraints that may inhibit them from sending a child to a non-guaranteed school or a school that is further away. 28 We also find that African American parents are more likely to respond to transparent information by choosing higher- suggests that the degree of simplification is not as important as just providing information on school test scores to parents at the time of choice. Furthermore, across the two samples, families with high-scoring 27 Hastings, Van Weelden, and Weinstein (2007) estimate the impact that simplified information had on the implicit weight placed on academics in a random-utility model of school choice. They find that information doubled the importance placed on test scores, a change in expressed preferences equivalent to that of a $65,000 increase in family income. Using these preference estimates, they simulate the change in demand for non-guaranteed schools if the entire sample were given simplified information. They find an 8 percentage point increase in demand, very similar to the reduced-form treatment effect identified in Table VI . The random utility model incorporates the characteristics of each family's choice set, such as distance to each school and distance to the guaranteed school. Thus a very large impact on preferences for academics may only results in an 8 percentage point increase in demand, due to the fact that families still face other trade-offs, such as relative transportation costs, when choosing a school. Our measure of average distances and test scores of schools within five miles is a reduced-form way of capturing these trade-offs. 28 All students in this setting are rising-grade students, so we cannot include an indicator for rising-grade students.
schools in close proximity are the most likely to choose better schools, as we would expect if parents face trade-offs between utility gains from academics versus proximity when choosing schools.
V. Impact on Test Scores
While simplified information on school test scores resulted in more parents choosing higher-scoring schools, it is not clear if students benefit academically from attending those schools. A handful of recent papers have examined the impact of attending first-choice schools on academic outcomes using lottery assignments in school choice plans to generate random variation in the test score at the school attended. 29 Angrist, Bettinger, and Kremer (2006) examine a voucher program in Colombia that provided one half of secondary school tuition by lottery to low-income high school students. Continuation of the voucher after the first year was predicated on sufficient academic progress. They find significant impacts of winning a voucher lottery on graduation rates and other measures of academic performance. 30 Cullen, Jacob and Levitt (2006) also examine subgroup impacts for students who picked high-performing schools. In that subgroup, winning a lottery increased the score of the school attended by 0.043 percentile points or about 0.18 student-level standard deviations. They do not find significant subgroup impacts on scores.
The two experiments in this paper provide an opportunity to examine the impact of attending higherscoring schools on own academic achievement for parents who were much more directed in choosing schools based on academic dimensions, as a result of receiving transparent information on test scores.
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The experiments have two slightly different designs, so we will analyze them separately. In the field experiment, we will focus on the non-NCLB students and instrument for the test score at the school attended with the random assignment of information and its interactions with baseline characteristics that lower the expected costs of responding to information by choosing a higher-scoring school. In the 2004 NCLB natural experiment, treatment and control groups were the same set of families before and after receiving NCLB-mandated information, so we do not see eventual academic outcomes for both treatment and control groups, as we do in the field experiment. However, since students of parents who chose alternative schools were subjected to a lottery admission process, we can use the lottery assignments to generate random variation in the score of the school attended. 
Field Experiment: The effect of attending a higher-scoring school on test score outcomes
where the dependent variable, Y, is a vector of test score outcomes, S is the endogenous average test score of the school attended in the 2006-2007 school year measured in student-level standard deviation units, X is a matrix of covariates that include randomization-block fixed effects as well as student-level baseline characteristics in specifications using student-level data. Equation (5) specifies the test score of the school 31 Using a random utility model, Hastings, Van Weelden, and Weinstein (2007) show that receiving information in the field experiment doubles parental preferences for test scores. Comparing mean preferences to those in Hastings, Kane, and Staiger (2007) , we see that receiving information effectively turned low-preference-for-academics families into high-preference-foracademics families.
attended as a function of the exogenous regressors. The excluded instrument is receiving information, and in specifications using student-level data, we will add as additional instruments interactions between receiving information and baseline characteristics that decrease the cost of attending a higher-scoring alternative school. Because standardized testing begins in third grade, we do not have outcome measures for kindergarteners, so we drop them from the analysis. This leaves us with 3,280 students in 33 schoolzones. Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) results are reported for each specification.
Standard errors are clustered at the school-program and grade attended for all specifications using student-level data.
The successive columns of the table show how the point estimates change with aggregation and the set of instruments used. The first column uses data aggregated at the school-zone level to examine the impact of the school-zone averaged score of the school attended on school-zone averaged test score outcomes. We instrument for the averaged score of the school attended using an indicator for whether the school-zone block received information. Because only 36% of students who chose alternative schools were admitted, receiving information is a weak predictor of the score of the school attended. 32 The point estimate on the score of the school attended is 0.336 but highly insignificant, with a standard error of 0.550. The p-value of the excluded instrument is only 0.09. The second column reports results for the same specification in column (1) but uses student-level data and adds baseline student-level controls for academic achievement, demographics, and choice-set characteristics. The instrument is still weak, with a p-value of 0.10. The point estimate on the test score of the school attended (0.183) is similar to that in column (1) but remains highly insignificant with a standard error of 0.398. 32 Once parents submitted their choice forms, admission to oversubscribed schools was granted based on a lottery process. Because of this lottery, only 36% of students were admitted to their first-choice school. Approximately the same fraction attended their chosen school. This comes both from students who won lotteries and attended their chosen school as well as students who were admitted off of waitlists into their chosen school over the summer as seats became available due to student mobility. Receiving information still increases the test score of the school attended versus the home school, but the effect is half of the magnitude for the score of the school chosen (0.05 instead of 0.10).
The third column has the same specification as column (2) but adds additional instruments that measure how easily a parent could choose a high-scoring alternative school. In particular, we include the average test score of schools within five miles and an indicator for whether the child is a single child in CMS, both interacted with receiving information. This increases the p-value of the excluded instruments to 0.04, the point estimate increases to 0.355, but it is not quite significant at the 10% level. The fourth column of Table VIII Once choice forms were submitted in July 2004, admissions were determined by lottery. The lottery was run based on the number of seats made available for each grade and school-choice combination. The lottery number was the concatenation of two priority numbers followed by a random number. Priority was given to students performing below grade level and to students who qualified for free or reduced lunch, to satisfy the NCLB requirement that the lowest-performing and poorest students be given the first right to attend an alternative school. We will use only the priority group (if any) in each grade and choice combination for which some students won and some students lost that lottery; that is, we include only students for whom lottery number alone determined admission. This leaves us with a very small sample of 227 students, since many students were in priority groups for which everyone was either admitted or denied admission for that particular grade and choice.
33 Table IX presents regression results of the form:
where w i is an indicator for whether student i won the lottery to attend her chosen school and L i is a vector of lottery fixed effects (Rouse 1998) . The dependent variables are listed as rows in Table IX, and each cell reports the coefficient and standard error for θ. Standard errors are clustered at the attended school program and grade level. The results show that winning a lottery to attend a chosen school had no significant impact on student baseline characteristics; however, it did significantly increase the probability of attending a chosen school by 0.60 and the score of the school attended by 0.34 student-level standard deviations.
34
Table X presents instrumental variables regressions of the form: Taken together, the results of these two experiments imply that providing clear information on school test scores within a choice plan increases the proportion of parents choosing higher-scoring schools for their children. These changed choices appear to have generated measurable improvements in academic outcomes. 36 The impact on own test scores for attending a school with higher average test scores is similar to the heterogeneous treatment effect that Hastings, Kane, and Staiger (2007) find for students whose parents selected schools with a strong implied preference for academics ('self-informed' parents). 35 Note that this is a valid instrument since we control for lottery fixed effects, and lottery number is randomly assigned within each school choice lottery. 36 In addition, average test score of the school attended is positively correlated with other school characteristics, such as attendance, safety, average peer income levels, and, potentially, teacher and staff quality. Thus, the impact on own academic outcome of moving from a low-performing school to a high-performing school should not be interpreted as the impact of test scores alone but rather of a potential bundle of school quality measures that are all correlated with higher average test scores. Future research may be able to determine the optimal type of information to provide to parents to increase test score outcomes.
In their study, the impact of winning the school choice lottery for families in upper quartile of the preference-for-test-score distribution was 0.082 student-level standard deviations, and winning the lottery resulted in them attending schools with 0.16 student-level standard deviation higher average test scores (a 0.51 impact).
37
It is important to note that these results do not imply that moving a random low-achieving child to a school with high average test scores will result in academic gains for that child. This study identifies the impact of the test score of the school attended off of parents who respond to school choice with information on test scores, through choosing an alternative school with an emphasis on academic achievement. 38 Other recent studies have estimated the impact of moving a child to a school with higher average test scores using exogenous changes in school assignments generated by busing for integration programs (Hoxby and Weingarth-Salyer 2005; Hastings and Weinstein 2008) . These studies find significant impacts of 0.16 -0.25 student-level standard deviations on own test scores from attending a school with one student-level standard deviation higher average test score. This suggests that the impact of attending a higher-performing school is larger for students of parents who are informed and seeking academics, than it is for an average student. Letting parents self-select and providing information so that they can make fully informed choices may be an important benefit of school choice over student assignment for a student's own academic outcome.
39

VI. Conclusions
37 From author's calculations using predicted test score gains from results in Table X , row (2) of Hastings, Kane, and Staiger (2007) for the upper quartile of the preference-for-test-scores in the sample used for the lottery analysis. 38 The results from Hastings, Kane, and Staiger (2007) can be seen as identifying the impact among families with high preferences for academics, that is, families who are informed and choose for academics on their own. 39 Notice that this does not imply that measures of overall student achievement will necessarily be higher under school choice. To understand this, one would need a model of achievement for each student who does not select a higher-performing school, as well as a supply-side model of school closures and openings as a district responds to choice by offering different products to maximize student achievement.
The goal of a public school choice plan is to increase academic outcomes for disadvantaged students by allowing them to attend higher-performing schools and by creating pressure on failing schools to improve through the threat of losing students. This implicitly assumes that disadvantaged families are fully informed about school academic performance and choose higher-performing schools when offered the opportunity to do so. This paper used two experiments in a public school choice plan to show that information and decision making costs play important roles in parental choice among low-to-middle income families. Providing clear statistics on school test scores with parents' choice forms resulted in significantly more parents choosing higher-scoring schools for their children. The impact of information on observed choice behavior was largest for families with higher-scoring schools in relatively close proximity, implying that school choice and information are most effective when parents have quality alternatives within a reasonable distance. Using the random variation in the test score of the school attended generated by each experiment, we find evidence that attending a higher-scoring school results in significant gains to own test score outcomes.
The results in this study suggest that simplified information on school academic achievement may have a significant impact on the efficacy of school choice plans for disadvantaged families. First, providing simplified information to families at relatively underperforming schools resulted in immediate academic gains from attending an alternative school. Second, because direct information on school test scores increased the fraction of parents choosing higher-scoring alternatives, policies that incorporate simple and direct information on academics may increase pressure on under-performing schools to improve achievement through the threat of losing students. These results add to growing evidence that the provision and framing of information may be an important tool that policy makers can use when choice is introduced to increase efficiency in public goods markets (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian 2006; McFadden The results also highlight the potential problems with incentives to provide information. In private markets with a standard rating, firms have the incentive to disclose ratings since high-rated firms will gain an increase in demand and low-rated firms will self-reveal if they do not post their ratings. 40 In public schooling, high-quality providers may not have an incentive to voluntarily post their scores if they only attract uniformed parents whose children may be relatively more costly to educate than those of informed parents. 41 Thus in such settings, incentives for voluntary advertising and disclosure may break down, potentially requiring additional incentive structures or mandates for information provision, as was the case for NCLB.
Yale University and National Bureau of Economic Research
Syracuse University 40 Mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure yield the same outcome, as long as the information is costlessly verifiable. Discussions of this information unraveling principle can be found in Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) . 41 For example, children of self-informed parents may be less costly to educate if those parents are more likely to participate and volunteer in school activities and education. Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 1 In columns (1) and (3), we exclude 2,071 and 141 students, respectively, with missing address data. 2 There were 8,284 students who received NCLB-mandated information in 2004. We began with the 8,284 students who received NCLB-mandated information. We exclude inactive students (221), special needs students and retentions (1,245), and students with missing demographics (123). 3 Indicates whether student's race is coded as African American in the administrative dataset. 4 Indicates whether student received free-or reducedlunch subsidies according to administrative data. 5 Average of test score in reading and math for North Carolina End of Grade exams, standardized by the district-wide mean and standard deviation for each grade level. Since only students in grades three through eight take exams, samples sizes are 50,182; 4,646; 62,759; 3,920; and 6,117, respectively, in columns (1) through (5). 6 Based on student residential locations, we computed each student's income as the median income in the 2000 Census for people of a student's own race living in a student's block group. 7 Computed from end of year tabulations of absences in the administrative database. Sample sizes for absences and suspensions are 115,699; 6,695; 125,285; 6,322; and 10,132, respectively, in columns (1) through (5), since not all students remain through the end of the year.
11 Computed from end of year tabulations of in-school and out-of-school suspensions in the administrative database. 3 We began with the 8,284 students who received NCLB-mandated information. We exclude inactive students (221), special needs students and retentions (1,245), and students with missing demographics (123).
4 School and program test scores are school and program means of student-level average test scores in reading and math for the North Carolina End of Grade exams, standardized by the district-wide mean and standard deviation for each grade level. 2 Sub-sample of students whose race is coded as African American in the administrative dataset.
3 School and program test scores are school and program means of student-level average test scores in reading and math for the North Carolina End of Grade exams, standardized by the district-wide mean and standard deviation for each grade level. 4 We computed the driving distance (in miles) from each student's residence to each school that the student could choose. This variable is the average test score defined in (4) for all schools within five miles. For the five students in the spring and the fifteen students in July with no schools within five miles, we used the average test score of schools and programs within ten miles. 2 Sample includes students in grades three through eight who took the North Carolina End of Grade exam. 3 Sample includes all students in column (1) who did not choose NCLB school and program first in the spring. 4 Sample includes all students in column (1) who did not choose NCLB school and program first in July.
5 Sample includes all students in column (2) who did not choose NCLB school and program first in either choice round.
6 Driving distance (in miles) from each student's residence to her NCLB school. 7 We computed the driving distance (in miles) from each student's residence to each school that the student could choose. We then calculated the mean distance for all schools and programs within five miles of the student's residence. For the 76, 67, 15, and 11 students in columns (1) through (4), respectively, with no schools within five miles, we used the driving distance to the closest school. 8 We computed the driving distance (in miles) from each student's residence to each school that the student could choose. We then calculated the mean test score for all schools and programs within five miles of the student's residence (see footnote 1). For the 76, 67, 15, and 11 students in columns (1) through (4), respectively, with no schools within five miles, we used the average test score of schools and programs within ten miles. 9 Indicates whether student does not have a sibling in CMS. 10 Indicates whether student is entering kindergarten or sixth grade in the fall.
11 Indicates whether student's race is coded as African American in the administrative dataset. 12 Indicates whether student received free-or reduced-lunch subsidies according to administrative data.
13
Indicates whether student is female according to administrative data.
14 Based on student residential locations, we computed each student's income as the median income in the 2000 Census for people of a student's own race living in a student's block group. Demeaned income is obtained by subtracting the countywide average income of $51,000 and dividing by 1,000. 15 Computed from end of year tabulations of absences in the administrative database. 16 Computed from end of year tabulations of in-school and out-of-school suspensions in the administrative database.
17 Average of the test score in reading and math for the North Carolina End of Grade exams, standardized by the district-wide mean and standard deviation for each grade level. Notes: 1 All regressions include randomization-block fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, and p-values are in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance (*=.10, **=.05, ***=.01).
2 School-zone fraction of students whose race is coded as African American in the administrative dataset.
3 School-zone fraction of students received free-or reduced-lunch subsidies according to administrative data. 4 Based on student residential locations, we computed each student's income as the median income in the 2000 Census for people of a student's own race living in a student's block group.
5 School-zone average of the student mean test score in reading and math for the North Carolina End of Grade exams standardized by the district-wide mean and standard deviation for each grade level. Since only students in grades three through eight take North Carolina End of Grade exams, the samples sizes for this variable are 28 school-zones that received Score forms, 11 school-zones that received Odds forms, and 25 school-zones that were in the control group.
6 School-zone average of student's number of in-school and out-of-school suspensions in the administrative database.
7 School-zone average of student end of year tabulations of absences in the administrative database. Notes: All regressions include randomization-block fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance (*=.10, **=.05, ***=.01). 1 Each column presents separate OLS regressions of aggregated choice behavior on indicators for whether the school-zone received a Score form or an Odds form (Scores and Odds Separately) or an indicator for whether the school-zone received any type of information (Scores and Odds pooled), controlling for randomization-block fixed effects.
2 Weight by the number of students in each school-zone. 3 A guaranteed option is the school and program in which the student was currently enrolled, or, in the case of rising-grade students, her home school.
4 School and program test scores computed by taking school and program means of student-level average test scores in reading and math for the North Carolina End of Grade exams, standardized by the district-wide mean and standard deviation for each grade level. For high school choices, we used the results of the English I End of Course exam, taken by most ninth grade students. Notes: Asterisks indicate significance (*=.10, **=.05, ***=.01). First column includes students in grades three through eight who took the North Carolina End of Grade exam in the spring of 2006. Second column includes all students in column (1) who chose their non-guaranteed option first. Each column includes controls for level effects (distance to guaranteed option, average distance to schools in five miles, average test score of schools in five miles, test score at guaranteed school, an indicator if the student is African American, indicator if the student receives lunch subsidies, indicator if student is a single child in CMS, student's baseline combined test score, baseline number of absences, baseline number of out of school suspensions, an indicator if the student was in a magnet program) as well as randomization-block fixed effects. All school and program test scores are school and program means of student-level average test scores in reading and math for the North Carolina End of Grade exams, standardized by the district-wide mean and standard deviation for each grade level. For high school choices, we used the results of the English I End of Course exam, taken by most ninth grade students. 1 A guaranteed option is the school and program the student was currently enrolled, or, in the case of rising-grade students, her home school.
2 Indicates whether student received a Score or Odds form. 3 Driving distance (in miles) from each student's residence to her guaranteed option. 4 We computed the driving distance (in miles) from each student's residence to each school that the student could choose. We then calculated the mean distance for all schools and programs within five miles of the student's residence. For the 179 to 473 students with no schools within five miles, we used the driving distance to the closest school.
5 Average test score for all schools and programs within five miles of the student's residence (see footnote 2). For the 179 to 473 students with no schools within five miles, we used the average test score of the closest school and program. 6 A student is a single child in CMS if there are no other students in CMS with the same last name and address.
7 Average of the test score in reading and math for the North Carolina End of Grade exams, standardized by the district-wide mean and standard deviation for each grade level. 8 Computed from end of year tabulations of absences in the administrative database. 9 Computed from end of year tabulations of out-of-school suspensions in the administrative database. Notes: Asterisks indicate significance (*=.10, **=.05, ***=.01). Column (1) presents LIML results for school-zone averaged test score of school attended on school-zoned averaged test score outcomes. There were 33 non-NCLB school-zones in the experiment where students were old enough to take standardized exams. The instrument for school-averaged score of school attended is an indicator if the school zone received Scores or Odds forms. Regression controls for randomization-block fixed-effects. Columns (2)-(4) present LIML results using student-level data. Coefficient reported is the impact of the test score at the attended school and program on own combined test score. Each regression controls for randomization block fixed effects and the following baseline covariates: indicator if the student is a single child in CMS, average test score of schools within five miles, average distance to schools within five miles, driving distance from each student's residence to her guaranteed option, an indicator if the student is African American, an indicator if the student receives lunch subsidies, average of the standardized test score in reading and math for the North Carolina End of Grade exams, number of absences, number of out-of-school suspensions, and an indicator for whether the student had at least one out-of-school suspension. The instruments for test score of the school attended are listed in each column. School and program test scores computed by taking school and program means of student-level average test scores in reading and math for the North Carolina End of Grade exams, standardized by the district-wide mean and standard deviation for each grade level. Notes: Asterisks indicate significance (*=.10, **=.05, ***=.01). We restrict our sample to only students for whom lottery number alone determined admission. Of the 1,092 students who submitted a choice form in July 2004, 227 students fall into such priority groups. 
